We present a general proof theoretical methodology for default systems. Given a default theory W, D , the default rules D are simply understood as restrictions on the tableaux construction of the logic. Different default approaches have their own way of understanding these restrictions and executing them. For each default approach (such as Reiter, Brewka or Lukaszewicz), the allowable default extensions can be obtained from the default tableau construction. The advantage of our approach, besides being simple and neat, is in its generality: it allows for the development of a default theory for any logic with a tableau formulation, such as intuitionistic logic, linear logic or modal logic.
Introduction
This paper attempts to give a default methodology within the framework of the general theory of logical systems. Given a logical system such as classical logic, intuitionistic logic, modal logic etc. we want to give a meaning to the notion of a default methodology suitable for that system. We identify the basic notions and constructions involved and study their nature. We hope that this methodological approach will help understanding the multitude of default logics proposed in the literature (see for example [Rei80, Luk84, Luk88, GCH90, DJ91, Bre91, Ryc91, Sha91, GLPT91, DL92, GM94b]).
To give an idea of our view, consider the following steps. Formulate a logical system L in some language and if possible, a tableau system for L. The tableau system is a refutation system for the logic, hence a construction allowing us to find countermodels. The construction is specified by a sequence of algorithmic moves (tableau expansion rules). Any restriction D on these algorithmic moves reduces the possibility of countermodels. A default methodology is such a restriction. Defaults are rules of special nature since they involve the notion of consistency in the logic. This makes their characterization more difficult, since consistency has to be checked whithin the computation. So, to develop a default methodology we need a prooftheoretic framework where the proofs and the consistency checks concern the same kind of combinatorial moves. This context is that of tableaux. In fact, the semantic nature of tableau proofs gives us the information about consistency when a failure to prove occurs and a countermodel is built. In classical logic, for instance, A ⊢ B if the tableau for A ∪ {¬B} is closed, and B is consistent with A if the tableau for A ∪ {B} is open.
It turns out that tableau constructions can directly exhibit consistency in so being suitable to express a default methodology as a restriction on the countermodels. This restriction, in fact, by limiting the number of countermodels, adds information (because we have less countermodels to refute), thus the basic intuition of default reasoning as a mean to add assumptions in the presence of incomplete knowledge is still identifiable in our approach. This paper has two objectives.
1. Develop the idea of a default methodology that is a restriction of the tableau construction of any logic, making sure that these restrictions involve consistency considerations.
2. Apply our methodology to the case-study of defaults in classical logic.
As for the first issue, one may wonder why we need default theories for general non classical logics, i.e. intuitionistic defaults, modal defaults, temporal defaults, and so forth. The reason is not purely theoretical: there are applications where such systems are useful. Consider, for example, special defaults involving time. The question to be asked then is whether we need a finer default theory for classical logic paying special attention to the way classical logic handles non classical phenomena, or we can be satisfied with a general default mechanism based on non classical logics. Gabbay indeed has shown in [Gab93] that the majority of non classical logics can be translated into classical logic with two sorts and therefore, from the technical point of view, the treatment of defaults in non classical logic can be seen as a refinement of default theory for classical logic.
Since we do have a clear intuition about various kinds of defaults ( modal, temporal and other kinds) we would like a refined theory of defaults for classical logic. To formulate such a theory we need to pay attention to how non classical phenomena, for example time, are expressed in classical logic. This is usually done by extra time parameters or, in general, extra indices which are handled separately. A tableau system for classical logic with these extra indices is technically the same as a tableau system for non classical logic, where the indices are worlds. In fact, treating defaults directly for non classical logic via a tableau would be technically clearer than doing a refinement of classical logic.
The main idea behind our methodology can be highlighted by recalling that a default is a special rule involving the notion of consistency in the logic. We generalise the presentation of a default rule as:
where α + , α − , γ + and γ − are formulae of the logic, and we manage to have two parallel tableaux, one for consequence and one for consistency. If in one tableau we can prove α + and in the other we can state the consistency of α − , then we can add γ + to one tableau and γ − to the other. To clarify the role of default as a restriction in the default tableau procedure, the tableau expansion rules of the logic are extended with a special rule called default tableau restriction rule (dtrr):
where ∆ + and ∆ − are formulae of the logic L and the meaning of dtrr is: if ∆ + proves α + and α − is tableau consistent with ∆ − , then add γ + to ∆ + and γ
Our procedure can be applied to any kind of default system (say Reiter's, Lukaszewicz' or Brewka's one). The details are worked out in the paper, which is organized as follows.
In Section 2 we briefly present default logic and some of the various default systems proposed so far. In Section 3, after a sketchy presentation of semantic tableaux, we introduce the default tableau restriction rule and define our default tableau system.
In Section 4 we specify our methodology when the underlying logic is propositional classical and show how it can be used for Brewka's (Section 4.1), Reiter's (Section 4.2) and Lukaszewicz' (Section 4.3) systems; namely we show that when a Reiter's, Brewka's or Lukaszewicz' extension is decidable, then it can be computed by the default tableau procedure. In Section 4.4 we make a comparison among the systems presented and discuss the different features of the default methodology for each of them.
In Section 5 we present the default methodology on an intuitionistic basis. This is a paradigmatic example of the use of the default tableau construction for non classical logics; furthermore, by this method, we introduce a proof-theoretic way to define default extensions when the basic default logic is not classical. Finally, in Section 6, we compare our default tableau construction with some other approaches to default proof procedures presented in the literature.
Preliminaries on default reasoning
Default reasoning was introduced by Reiter [Rei80] , who gave the first definition of default theory. A default theory is a pair W, D where W is a set of well formed formulae of L (we can assume here that L is classical propositional logic P C) and D is a set of defaults, i.e. rules of the form δ = α : β 1 , . . . , β n γ , where α, β i , i = 1, . . . , n, and γ are formulae of P C and are respectively called prerequisite, justifications, and conclusion of the default rule. The intuition of default logic is that defaults are sort of 'meta-rules' which can be used to supply the underlying incomplete theory with supplementary assumptions [Rei80] . The proof-theoretical flavour of this intuition is that a conclusion of a default δ ∈ D must be added to the set of premises when the prerequisite of δ has been proved and its justifications are in some relation of consistency with some set of formulae. In general, the application of a new default may render the condition for which a default has been previously applied no more valid, hence the conclusion of this default must be retracted. Default theories generate deductively closed theories E called extensions obtained by means of a fixed point equation (see Section 4.2 for the Reiter's definition of extension). Extensions have many interesting properties. Reiter (see [Rei80] , Theorem 24) has shown that if E and F are two extensions of a default theory and E ⊆ F then E = F . Furthermore, a default theory W, D has an inconsistent extension if and only if the set W of assumptions is inconsistent (see [Rei80] , Corollary 2.2). Extensions, however, do not always exist, for example the default theory ({p ⊃ q, ¬q}, { : ¬q p })
does not have an extension, though its initial set of assumptions is consistent. Reiter did not find this property encouraging; in effect it may lead to some unwanted situation, e.g. the loss of all the assumptions when peculiar defaults are present. Commonsense reasoning may also require to deal with defaults expressed in some simplified form. A default may have the form δ = α : β β which is called a normal default and δ = α : β ∧ γ γ which is called a semi-normal default. Normal defaults behave better than general defaults; for instance, every normal default theory has an extension (see [Rei80] , Theorem 3.1).
Whether general defaults are really useful or not has been widely discussed. In particular, Lukaszewicz suggests [Luk88] to use semi-normal defaults on the basis of the fact that, by translating any default δ = α : β γ of a default theory W, D into a semi-normal one tr(δ) = α : β ∧ γ γ , if W, D has an extension E, then E is also an extension of W, tr(D) (the converse is not true). Semi-normal defaults can be used to control interaction between defaults (see also Etherington [Eth87] for an analysis of semi-normal defaults). There are semi-normal default theories which have no extensions.
To overcome the problem of default theories without extensions Lukaszewicz in [Luk84] introduces a new formulation of default logic in which default extensions are always ensured when the initial set of assumptions W is consistent (the Lukaszewicz' formulation is presented in Section 4.3). A proposal similar to that of Lukaszewicz is presented by Guerreiro, Casanova and Hemerly in [GCH90] ). The idea of Lukaszewicz is to block the application of a new default δ if its conclusion conflicts with the justifications of the applied defaults (including δ itself). So, for instance, in the above example, the default δ = : ¬q p is blocked because its conclusion p together with W = {p ⊃ q, ¬q} generates an inconsistent theory which conflicts with the justification ¬q.
The condition of applicability of a default introduced by Lukaszewicz imposes a semi-monotonic property to the default logic since a default, once applied, persists. A default theory ∆ = (W, D) is said semi-monotonic if, given a default theory ∆ ′ = (W, D ′ ) with D ⊆ D ′ and E an extension of ∆, there exists an extension E ′ of ∆ ′ s.t. E ⊆ E ′ and the set of defaults in D generating E is a subset of those generating E ′ . In addition to Lukaszewicz' contribution, many other proposals address variants of Reiter's default logic to resolve situations where Reiter's default logic exhibits a behaviour which does not correspond to the intuition of default theory ( see for instance [Poo84, GCH90, DJ91, Bre91, Ryc91, Sha91, GLPT91, DL92, GM94b]).
Among the variants of default logic, Brewka's one is significative from a prooftheoretical point of view as it formalizes cumulative default logic. Cumulativity is a welcome property, since it preserves the set of consequences of a default theory when some consequence is added to the premises (for a discussion on cumulativity and other interesting properties of nonmonotonic reasoning see [CG88, Mak88, KLM90] ). The Brewka's variant, called CDL, is based on an extension of the notion of supported theory, already introduced by Lukaszewicz in [Luk88] . It is called assertional default theory: a formula is labeled with the set of justifications and conclusions used to prove it (for the definitions concerning CDL default theory and CDL extension see Section 4.1). Brewka's variant is semi-monotonic. Furthermore, he imposes a different condition on applicability. The main idea is that of defining commitment to the assumptions, namely if a default is applied with justification β then another default with justification ¬β cannot be applied. An illustrative example on commitment is given in [Poo89c] ; we reconsider that problem in intuitionistic default logic in Section 5. A further variant of cumulative default logic which is not semi-monotonic has been proposed by Giordano and Martelli in [GM94b] . In addition, Gottlob and Mingyi propose a finite characterization of CDL extensions in [GM94c] .
A comparison among all the variants of default logic presented in the literature can be found in [FM94] and [ACAP95] , where a systematic approach to default logic is presented. A general treatment of default logic can be found in Besnard [Bes89] and Lukaszewicz [Luk90] . We leave the discussion on the proof-procedures presented in the literature to Section 6.
3
Default tableau systems
Semantic tableaux are due to Fitting, Smullyan [Fit83, Smu68] and, back, to Beth and Hintikka. In this section we briefly introduce signed semantic tableaux for classical logic (P C) and intuitionistic logic (I). We limit our attention to these logical systems (L will be used in the sequel to denote anyone of these logics) as they are suitable to exemplify our general default methodology. The methodology is introduced in this section through the construction of default tableaux. Notational convention. Given a logic L (P C or I) and its set of well formed formulae, we shall use also signed formulae, that is to say formulae of the form T ϕ or F ϕ, where T stands for true, F for false and ϕ is a formula of L. Symbols Γ and ∆ will be used to denote sets of (unsigned) formulae, X and Y to denote sets of signed formulae.
Signed semantic tableaux refer to signed formulae (see [Fit83] and [Fit89] for detailed definitions and results on signed (unsigned) semantic tableaux for propositional, intuitionistic and modal logic). In the following we shall call a tableau system for a logic L the L-tableau system, consequently, terms like consistency, proofs, etc. referring to the logic L will be prefixed by L.
Here we recall that, informally, if X is a finite set of formulae in L, a L-tableau for X is a tree whose root is labeled by X and every non-root node is obtained from a preceding node in the same branch (i.e. a path from the root to a leaf) by means of the application of a L-tableau rule. L-tableau rules, i.e. relations between sets of signed formulae are, in general, called expansion rules, as an application of a rule to a node expands the L-tableau.
When L is propositional logic, following Fitting [Fit83] , we divide tableau rules for classical connectives into α and β rules, as follows:
Negation is treated by the following rules that can be considered either α or β rules:
In intuitionistic logic the connectives ∨ and ∧ are called regular and tableau rules for them are similar to the corresponding classical ones, while ⊃ and ¬ are called special (see [Fit83] ). In the following the rules are listed for the special connectives ( X ♯ is the subset of X consisting of all the true signed formulae of X):
Notice that a L-tableau system is identified by the set of rules for the connectives of the logic.
A branch in a L-tableau is said to be closed if there is a node which contains either both T ϕ and F ϕ or T ⊥ or F ⊤. A L-tableau is said closed if all its branches are closed, otherwise it is said open. A L-tableau is said to be atomic if all its leaf nodes contain literals. If a L-tableau is closed it is also atomically closed. A L-tableau T is said to be saturated if either it is atomic or any expansion rule applied to T yields a L-tableau T ′ whose leaf nodes already occur in T . L-tableaux are sound and complete (see [Fit83] and [Fit89] ). They are used as a refutation system: to prove that a formula ϕ is a theorem of L one starts with a
More generally, if Γ is a set of formulae of L we say that ϕ has a L-tableau proof from Γ iff there exists a closed L-tableau for X ∪ {F ϕ}, where X is the set of all T α with α ∈ Γ. Hence we say that Γ proves ϕ in L iff ϕ has a L-tableau proof from Γ. L-consistency follows the notion of L-proof: ϕ is L-consistent with Γ iff no L-tableau for X ∪ {F ϕ} closes (as above, X is the set of all T α with α ∈ Γ): in this case we say that ϕ is L-tableau consistent with Γ. We remind the reader that when L is P C, if X ∪ {T ϕ} has an open P C-tableau, then no P C-tableau for X ∪ {T ϕ} closes.
Tableaux are called semantic because they mimic a model construction: in the case when X ∪ {T ϕ} is L-tableau consistent, all open L-tableaux provide enough information to build effective models for ϕ; analogously, if X ∪ {F ϕ} is L-tableau consistent one can build effective countermodels for it.
We are now ready to introduce a new special rule for L-tableau systems: a default tableau restriction rule. To give an intuition, suppose that Γ does not prove ϕ; then there is some model of Γ in which ϕ is falsified. Suppose also that some condition Ψ to accept ϕ is satisfied and hence one would like to add ϕ as a theorem. In this case to prove ϕ from Γ one should get rid of these unwanted countermodels of ϕ. Since tableaux provide a model construction, the operation of limiting the countermodels can be performed during the tableau proof of ϕ by a special rule, acting as a restriction rule. However, before limiting the construction of countermodels the special rule should also verify that the conditions Ψ, enabling to accept ϕ, hold. Hence the action of the special rule is twofold: verify acceptability and limit the construction of countermodels.
In the following we consider pairs of sets of formulae of L, ∆ + and ∆ − . ∆ + and ∆ − consist of generic formulae of L and together they form a supported theory of L. More precisely: ∆ − is the support set of ∆ + . As we deal with supported theories, the definition of a default theory becomes as follows:
theory and D is a set of default rules of the form α
Observe that the above definition applies to any default system, since the role of prerequisites, justifications and conclusions is preserved. Furthermore, with this notation we write a default simply as a rule of the form α γ .
Let ∆ = ∆ + , ∆ − and ϕ = ϕ + , ϕ − , the derivability relation ⊢ on formulae is defined as:
The derivability relation ⊢ on pairs of sets of formulae ϕ, ∆ is defined as follows:
Notational convention. Observe that if we restrict ourselves only to ∆ + or ∆ − then the derivability relation is ∆
proves ϕ − ; however we shall omit the subscripts + or − from the derivability relation. We shall use the symbol ⊕ to denote the union of a formula with a set of formulae.
Definition 3 (default tableau restriction rule) Given a pair ∆ = ∆ + , ∆ − and formulae α + , α − , γ + and γ − , the default tableau restriction rule has the form:
Where the meaning of dtrr is:
if ∆ + proves α + and α − is tableau consistent with ∆ − , then add γ + to ∆ + and γ
Definition 4 (applicability) The default tableau restriction rule is said to be applicable to ∆ + , ∆ − whenever ∆ + proves α + and α − is tableau consistent with ∆ − .
Observe that a dtrr is used with default rules, hence when a dtrr is applied to
, we say that δ i has been used. Similarly to default rules, the default tableau restriction rule is compulsory i.e. we have to apply it whenever it is applicable to ∆ + , ∆ − .
Definition 5 (default tableau proof ) Let W, D be a default theory in some fixed logic L (whether the theory is defined in Reiter's system or in some of its variants), a default tableau proof in L for W, D is a sequence of pairs ∆
and each ∆ i+1 is obtained from the previous ∆ i by the application of the default tableau restriction rule to ∆ i with some default in D.
Definition 6 (∆-saturation) Let ∆ = ∆ + , ∆ − . ∆ is said to be ∆-saturated iff for any applicable dtrr:
When no confusion arises between tableau saturation and ∆-saturation we shall just use the term saturation.
To illustrate default tableau proofs, consider a default theory W, D (again, the default system is irrelevant). We suppose that D is finite and, to simplify the exposition, we suppose that L is P C. Imagine we have two parallel processes that provide tableau constructions, one starting with W + = ∆ 
− is tableau consistent with ∆ − , whence the dtrr is applicable, i.e. we exit from the special box with SUCCESS.
If we have succeded, the application of the dtrr amounts to adding γ + to ∆ 
apply dtrr to ∆ 0 with
Observe that if a failure is reported, that is, if the dtrr is not applicable, then if ∆ is saturated the default tableau proof is terminated and we exit with ∆, otherwise we verify another dtrr. Observe also that when L is P C no backtracking is needed, in fact, the failure of a dtrr amounts to re-apply it to the same set ∆, if not ∆-saturated, just with another default. It is clear from the above construction that if W + = W − and a default theory W, D is defined in such a way that for any default rule α
In the next section we show how the construction works for Brewka's, Reiter's and Lukaszewicz' systems. For the last two systems, however, this process requires some more conditions to be verified.
Tableau construction for default systems
In this section we show that the tableau restriction rule characterizes, in the classical case, the default extensions of Reiter's, Brewka's and Lukaszewicz' systems. We give a representation theorem for each of them. In the presentation of the default tableaux we do not follow a chronological order; we shall treat Brewka's system first because his assertional default logic is, in some sense, more suited to our methodology.
In the intuitionistic case the default tableau construction leads to a notion of extension which cannot be related to those obtained in the classical case. It should be noticed that a notion of default in intuitionistic logic is not yet settled. We illustrate how intuitionism can be suitable for default reasoning in Section 5.
Going back to the classical case, we begin by considering Brewka's default system.
Brewka's default system
Brewka introduces a special kind of formulae, namely assertions. An assertion is a formula of the form p : {r 1 , . . . , r n } , where p, r 1 , . . . , r n are formulae. Given a set T of assertions, Brewka calls the set {r|J p : {r 1 , . . . , r, . . . , r n } ∈ T } the support of T . It is denoted by Supp(T ); while the set {p|J p : {r 1 , . . . , r n } ∈ T } is called the set of asserted formulae of T and is denoted by F orm(T ). If T is a set of assertions, the deductive closure with respect to T , denoted by T h S (T ), is the smallest set s.t. T ⊆ T h S (T ) and if
Brewka's default system is called CDL; in the following we shall use the same name.
Definition 7 (CDL extension) A CDL extension of an assertional default theory T, D is a fixed point of the operator Γ which, given a set of assertions S, produces the smallest set S ′ such that:
To obtain a semi-constructive characterization for a default theory W, D , Brewka
shows that a CDL-extension is E = ∞ i=0 E i where:
Notice that also in the above construction the consistency of {β, γ} ∪ F orm(E) ∪ Supp(E) needs to be checked. We now show how a tableau construction with the general default tableau restriction rule is constructive. Let W, D be a CDL-default theory and δ = α : β γ any default in D then the tableau default restriction rule for CDL is as follows:
whose meaning is if ∆ + proves α + = α and α − = (β ∧ γ) is tableau consistent with ∆ − then add γ + = γ to ∆ + and γ − = β ∧ γ to ∆ − . Hence, in the context of Brewka's system, when we refer, to α + we mean α while α − stands for (β ∧ γ), γ + for γ and γ − for (β ∧ γ).
Note that, because of the way we rewrite CDL defaults, they appear to be seminormal defaults. This rewriting, however, only affects the way CDL defaults are dealt with by the dtrr. Otherwise the structure of a CDL default rule is not affected at all. See Section 5 for a discussion on this issue. Now, in order to obtain Brewka's extensions, one starts with the initial theory F orm(W ) = ∆ 
To prove that a default tableau construction leads, indeed, to a CDL extension, we need to show first that Brewka's default system enjoys compactness. To this end we introduce a notion of CDL-proof.
Definition 8 (CDL-proof ) Let E be a set of assertions and let W, D be a default theory. E * is a CDL-proof of ϕ : J in E iff ϕ : J ∈ E * ⊆ E and there exists a finite set of assertions
Lemma 9 (CDL-Compactness) Let E be a set of assertions and let W, D be a default theory. E is a CDL-extension of W, D iff for any assertion ϕ : J , with ϕ : J ∈ E, there exists a CDL-proof of ϕ : J in E.
Proof Let ϕ : J in E then ϕ : J ∈ E i for some i ≥ 0. The construction of E i has been given above (see also Proposition 2.9 of [Bre91] ). We prove the statement by induction on the index i of E i .
). Suppose that the statement holds for all ϕ : J ∈ E j , for j ≤ i; we have to show that it holds for all ϕ : J ∈ E i+1 . Let ϕ : J ∈ E i+1 . Two cases may occur. Suppose first that ϕ : J ∈ T h S (E i ). In this case there exist r 1 : J 1 , . . . , r n : J n ∈ E i with ϕ : J ∈ T h S ({ r 1 : J 1 , . . . , r n : J n }). By the induction hypothesis there exist finite W * j and D * j and extensions E * j of W * j , D * j , with r j : J j ∈ E * j and
It is easy to show that E * is a fixed point of the operator Γ satisfying the conditions of Definition 2.5 of [Bre91] with respect to the assertional default theory
is consistent, as by hypothesis ϕ : J ∈ E.
Since α : J ∈ E i , by the induction hypothesis there exist finite W ′ and D ′′ and
is consistent then γ : J ∪ {β, γ} ∈ E. But if α : J ∈ E then, by hypothesis, there is a CDL-proof for ϕ; J hence a CDL-extension E * ⊆ E with respect to some W ′ ⊆ W and D ′ ⊆ D, with α : J ∈ E * . We can suppose thatδ ∈ D ′ and γ : J ∪ {β, γ} ∈ E * . In fact, if it is not, clearly, the set of assertions E * ′ , with
Theorem 10 (Completeness) Let T, D be a CDL-default theory and L be classical logic. Let T be translated as the assertional pairs W = { α : {} | with α ∈ T }. E is a CDL extension for W, D iff there exists a sequence of sets of pairs of formulae ∆ 0 , ∆ 1 . . . ∆ n , . . . s.t., for each i, ∆ 0 , ∆ 1 . . . ∆ i is a default tableau proof, the set E ′ = {γ|∆ i ⊢ γ, for some i} is ∆-saturated and
Proof The only-if part is straightforward, hence we show just the if-part. Let E be a CDL-extension. Let us associate a finite sequence ∆ k,j , with 1 ≤ j ≤ m(k) for some m(k), with each assertion α k : J k in the ordering. The sequence ∆ k,j is ordered according to a lexicographic ordering on the set of indices. Suppose that ∆ p,j has been already constructed for all p, p < k. The sequence ∆ k,j is constructed as follows: since α k : J k ∈ E then α k : J k ∈ E i , for some i, where E i is defined as in Proposition 2.9 of [Bre91] .
For Lemma 9 α k : J k ∈ E implies that there are finite W ′ and D ′ and an 
Now, D ′ and W ′ are finite and thus we can suppose, without loss of generality, that each T h S (E k j ) is obtained from the previous T h S (E k j−1 ) by using just one new default. Namely
We can now define the element ∆ k,i as follows:
, where is the lexicographic ordering Each ∆ + k,i is tableau consistent, furthermore the sequence of pairs of sets ∆ 0 , ∆ 1 , . . . , ∆ k,i ordered by the lexicographic ordering, is a default tableau proof.
Let E ′ = {γ|∆ k,i ⊢ γ for some k and i}. It is easy to prove that E ′ − =
Cn(F orm(E) ∪ Supp(E)) and E
for any default δ = α : β γ in D applicable with a dtrr, E
To show this, suppose that E + ′ proves α and E ′ − ∪ {β ∧ γ} is tableau consistent. We have that E + proves α iff α ∈ F orm(E) since E ′ + = F orm(E), and E ′ − ∪ {β ∧ γ} is tableau consistent iff {β, γ} ∪ F orm(E) ∪ Supp(E) is consistent, since E ′ − = Cn(F orm(E) ∪ Supp(E)). As E is an extension, from the hypothesis of applicability of the default restriction rule together with the above two equivalences we have γ : J ∪ {β, γ} ∈ E for some J ∈ Supp(E). This proves that E ′ + ⊢ γ and
It is a matter of routine to verify that a saturated set E ′ = {γ|∆ i ⊢ γ} where ∆ 0 , . . . , ∆ i is a default tableau proof, for all i, is a CDL-extension.
Notice that the above theorem does not establish an exact equivalence between a CDL-extension and an extension obtained by a default tableau proof in the Brewka's system, as E ′ − = Supp(E) though E ′ + = F orm(E). However, F orm(E) ∪ Supp(E) is consistent when E is an extension and thus, without loss of generality, T h S can be redefined to obtain as a new support of a set T of assertions the deductive closure of
On this basis, Definition 2.5 of [Bre91] can be rephrased as follows: A Brewka extension of an assertional default theory T, D is a fixed point of the operator Γ which, given a set of assertions S, produces the smallest set S ′ such that:
Hence Theorem 10 can be restated as follows:
Theorem 11 Let T, D be a CDL-default theory and L be classical logic. Let T be translated as the assertional pairs W = { α : {} | with α ∈ T }. E is a CDL extension for W, D iff there exists a sequence of sets of pairs of formulae ∆ 0 , ∆ 1 . . . ∆ n , . . . s.t., for each i, ∆ 0 , ∆ 1 . . . ∆ i is a default tableau proof, the set E ′ = {γ|∆ i ⊢ γ, for some i} is ∆-saturated and E ′ = E.
Example 12 Consider the default theory T, D with
The default tableau proof is shown in Figure 2 :
Special BOX for dtrr We can see that the special box under T + 1 is successful, namely ∆ proves b. However, the special box under T − 1 yields a closed tableau: hence we have a failure. Since ∆ = ∆ 0 ∪ ∆ 1 is trivially saturated (there are no more defaults to be used), then we exit with ∆. This is consistent with Brewka's approach where the second default is, by commitment, unapplicable with the first one. The extension is E = {γ|
) and E − = Cn({b, ¬e, a}). A Brewka's extension is E = { a ⊃ b : ∅ , a : {b, ¬e, a} , b : {b, ¬e, a }. It is easy to see that E + = F orm(E) and E − = Cn(F orm(E) ∪ Supp(E)).
Reiter's default system
In this section we show how to obtain a Reiter's extension with the default tableau construction. In Reiter's default system [Rei80] a default has the form: α : M β 1 , . . . , M β n /γ.
To simplify notation we define a Reiter's default as α : β γ . A Reiter's extension is defined as follows:
Definition 13 (Reiter's extension) Let W, D be a default theory in propositional logic. For any set S of propositional formulae, let Γ(S) be the smallest set satisfying the following three properties:
D3. If α : β γ ∈ D and α ∈ Γ(S) and ¬β ∈ S then γ ∈ Γ(S).
S is an extension iff S = Γ(S)
Reiter shows that an extension E for a default theory W, D is E = ∞ i=0 E i where:
and ¬β ∈ E}
The default tableau restriction rule applies to Reiter's default system and its analogues as follows:
Starting with ∆ 0 = W, W the rule yields a sequence
To simplify notation, we identify ∆ + n and ∆ − n with ∆ n . We require the following stability condition: let E = {γ|∆ i ⊢ γ, for some i} be ∆-saturated, for each default δ = α : β γ used with
and for each ∆ i , β is tableau consistent with ∆ i .
Such condition can be verified by the following tableau construction: if ∆ n proves α, then apply the cut rule on β, so that in each leaf node there is either T β or F β. As for Reiter's system, an analogous notion of default-proof and a default-compactness lemma can be given.
Definition 15 (Default-proof ) Let E be a set of formulae and let W, D be a de fault theory. E * is a default-proof of ϕ in E iff ϕ ∈ E * ⊆ E and there are finite sets
The proof of compactness is similar to that shown for CDL-extensions, by using the construction given in Theorem 2.1 of [Rei80] (instead of Proposition 2.9 of [Bre91] ):
Lemma 16 (Default-compactness) Let E be a set of formulae and W, D a default theory. E is a Reiter's extension iff for any formula ϕ in E there exists a default-proof of ϕ in E.
We can now show that a default tableau proof in Reiter's system leads to a Reiter extension.
Theorem 17 (Completeness) Let W, D be a default theory in Reiter's system and L be classical logic. E is a consistent Reiter's extension for W, D iff there exists a sequence of sets of formulae ∆ 0 , ∆ 1 . . . ∆ n , . . . s.t., for each i, ∆ 0 , ∆ 1 . . . ∆ i is a default tableau proof, the set E ′ = {γ|∆ i ⊢ γ, for some i} is ∆-saturated, satisfies the stability condition and E ′+ = E.
Proof Let E be a consistent Reiter's extension. Consider any ordering α 1 , . . . , α k , k ≤ ω, on the set of elements of E. By hypothesis T is consistent (see Corollary 2.2 of [Rei80] ) hence ∆ 0 = T is tableau consistent.
Let us associate a finite sequence ∆ k,j , with 1 ≤ j ≤ m(k) for some m(k), with each element α k of E, in the ordering. The sequence ∆ k,j is ordered according to a lexicographic ordering on the set of indices. Suppose that ∆ p,j has been already constructed for all p, p < k. The sequence ∆ k,j is constructed as follows: since α k ∈ E then α k ∈ E i , for some i, where E i is defined as in Theorem 2.1 of [Rei80] .
For Lemma 16, α k ∈ E implies that there are finite W ′ and D ′ and an extension 
1). Moreover it is
Now, D ′ and W ′ are finite and thus we can suppose, without loss of generality, that each Cn(E k j ) is obtained from the previous Cn(E k j−1 ) by using just one default. Namely
, where is the lexicographic ordering Each ∆ k,i is tableau consistent, furthermore the sequence of sets ∆ 0 , ∆ 1 , . . . , ∆ k,i with the lexicographic ordering, is a default tableau proof.
Let E ′ = {γ|∆ k,i ⊢ γ for some k and i}. It is easy to prove that E ′ = E. The set E is ∆-saturated, in fact as E is a Reiter extension if E proves α and E ∪ {β} is tableau consistent then γ ∈ E and hence E satisfies also the stability condition.
It is a matter of routine to verify that a ∆-saturated set E ′ = {γ|∆ i ⊢ γ}, satisfying the stability condition, where ∆ 0 , . . . , ∆ i is a default tableau proof, for all i, is a Reiter's extension.
Lukaszewicz' default system
Lukaszewicz' default system is possibly the hardest for a default tableau construction. The point is that, as in Brewka's, a default has to be tasted before application not only for justifications but also for conclusions. Differently from Brewka's, consistency is checked one default at a time with respect to the whole theory obtained so far, whence one has to trace, so to speak, what happens during a proof. Nevertheless, the contribution of Lukaszewicz to the theory of default logic is very significative (notice that Brewka's work inherits his results). In fact his formalization ensures a default extension to any default theory having consistent assumptions. To do this he introduces the notion of support (this notion was earlier introduced by Sandewall in [San85] ), thus leading to m-extensions. A m-extension is defined as follows:
Definition 18 (m-extension) Let W, D be a default theory in propositional logic. Define the operators Γ 1 and Γ 2 such that for any pairs of sets of formulae (S, U ), Γ 1 (S, U ) and Γ 2 (S, U ) are the smallest set satisfying:
E is a m-extension for W, D w.r.t. a set of formulae F iff E = Γ 1 (E, F ) and F = Γ 2 (E, F ). E is an m-extension for W, D iff there is a set F such that E is an m-extension for W, D with respect to F . The set F is called the set of justifications supporting E.
Lukaszewicz shows that a m-extension E for a default theory W, D , with respect
F i where:
and for each ϕ ∈ F ∪ {β}, E ∪ {γ} ⊢ ¬ϕ}
The dtrr for Lukaszewicz' system is applied to a default as follows:
In the following we shall identify α − with β ∧ γ, while α + = α and γ + = γ − = γ. The same comments as for Brewka's case apply here; that is, in Lukaszewicz' case, the way the application of the dtrr is performed amounts to rewriting a m-default as a semi-normal default. This is true as far as this is the way a m-default rule is used by a dtrr, otherwise the structure of a m-default rule is not affected at all.
We now introduce the notion of persistent default tableau proof which is suitable for Lukaszewicz' default system. Let l 0 : ∆ 0 , l 1 : ∆ 1 , . . . , l n : ∆ n be a sequence where l i are labels and ∆ i sets of formulae. Let D n be a set of defaults associated with l n . l n : ∆ n , and D n are inductively defined as follows:
ii) Let α γ be any default rule.
If dtrr is applicable to ∆ n−1 with α γ and for all defaults in D n−1 the dtrr is applicable with them to ∆ n−1 ∪ {γ} Theorem 19 (Completeness) Let W, D be a default theory in Lukaszewicz' system and L be classical logic. E is a Lukaszewicz' extension for W, D iff there exists a sequence of sets of pairs of formulae l 0 : ∆ 0 , l 1 : ∆ 1 . . . l n : ∆ n , . . . s.t., for each i, l 0 : ∆ 0 , l 1 : ∆ 1 . . . l i : ∆ i is a persistent default tableau proof, the set E ′ = {γ|l i : ∆ i ⊢ γ, for some i} is saturated w.r.t. the default restriction rules, and E ′+ = E.
Discussion on the proof procedures for Reiter's, Brewka's and Lukaszewicz' systems
In the previous sections we have presented an application of the default tableau procedure on classical logic to the three well known proposals of Reiter, Brewka and Lukaszewicz. The procedures for these systems show a common feature: two tableaux are expanded according to the tableau rules and the default tableau restriction rules until they become saturated. The main difference relies on the way these systems consider consistency of justfications. That is, the systems verify the consistency of justifications either with the theory computed step by step or with the theory computed when the tableau procedure halts. In some cases an extra control is required while in other cases the control may be simplified by taking into account two important features:
1. the translation of the standard defaults δ = α : β γ into the new format α
2. the way in which consistency of the justifications α − , used in the tableau proof, is interpreted by the system.
When the tableaux are saturated we have to make a global check on consistency for the set of justifications used in the tableaux. We may ask whether, by putting more control on the tableau construction, we may avoid the final global check of consistency for the used justifications. Unfortunately, this cannot in general be done for Reiter's system.
To see why, consider the following example. Suppose that we have processed all defaults but one, which is of the form δ = ⊤ : β γ with γ the negation of the justification of the default ϕ applied first ϕ. Suppose that we have defined a way to decide step by step whether a justification of an applied default is consistent with the final theory: this control would require to deal with δ before ϕ to inhibit the application of ϕ.
More generally, if we want to process a default at a time, a necessary condition must be defined to prevent the application of some defaults, which causes the withdrawal of other ones. This is, indeed, the property of semi-monotonicity: when a default is applied, its conclusion persists. Semi-monotonicity can be guaranteed by imposing some syntactical restrictions on the use of tableau restriction rules. For example in Brewka's system our procedure works fine because α − is implied by the conclusion γ − and no global check is required. In Brewka's default system, checking consistency step by step does not involve extra control on the construction of the tableau. In fact, Brewka's system is semi-monotonic and defaults correspond to normal defaults in the minus side of our translation, therefore this control is fulfilled by expanding the two tableaux in parallel.
In the case of Reiter's system, if all defaults of the last example were normal, then ¬γ would be in the set of consequences, hence δ would not be applicable.
Lukaszewicz system is also semi-monotonic (in fact we do not need a final global check) but the procedure suffers of an extra amount of computation with respect to the other systems. The reason is that, to ensure semi-monotonicity in such a system, we need to perform step by step a global check with respect to the theory which has been computed so far: this may result very expensive and complex. The reason is that Lukaszewicz system is a very rich system, in the sense that any default system has its extensions contained in some Lukaszewicz extension (see [ACAP95] ).
It comes out that the most elegant and clear computation is the one involving Reiter's notion of consistency, which requires a global consistency check to be verified in only one step, that is, at the end of the computation. The advantage of the procedure for Reiter's system with respect to the Brewka's one relies on the fact that we do not need to expand two parallel tableaux but just one.
Intuitionistic default tableau construction
In this section we show how to apply the default tableau methodology on an intuitionistic basis. Intuitionism has a kripkean semantics, therefore similar considerations can be applied to modal logics. The tableau construction with defaults is done in three steps:
• Find all open saturated tableaux, if any, of a given set of sentences, avoiding possible redundancy in the model construction.
• Apply the default tableau restriction rule on the current tableaux for ∆ + and ∆ − .
• After the tableau restriction rule has been applied, perform a check of consistency on the set of the used justifications with respect to the current tableaux for ∆ + and ∆ − , either step by step or when the computation halts.
A saturated intuitionistic tableau is obtained by expanding each branch according to the application of intuitionistic rules (see Section 3) to some observed signed formula. A branch can thus be seen as a sequence of intuitionistic worlds which are accessible following the natural ordering of the sequence: the application of a special rule corresponds to access a world below in the sequence. In effect an intuitionistic tableau can be seen as a Kripke model. In the intuitionistic case, to build all the possible models of a default theory one needs to backtrack on the ordering of application of the special tableau rules (those causing a move from a world to an accessible one) and on the ordering of application of the default tableau restriction rules. This makes a nontrivial difference with the propositional classical case, in which the ordering of tableau rules is not important, and hence only the leaf nodes of the last two tableaux (for ∆ + and ∆ − ) can be processed. The application of the default restriction rule in the intuitionistic case requires to update the whole current tableaux: the conclusion T γ + (or T γ − ) must be added to the root of the open saturated tableaux of ∆ + . Tableaux are trees and obviously a procedure to dynamically modify these trees would be prohibitive.
We solve this problem by associating labels with formulae, so that, the tree structure of the tableau is given by a relation on the labels: when a default restriction rule is applied, the tableau is extended incrementally with new labeled formulae.
A labeled tableau is a set of formulae D labeled by a pair σ, τ , where σ is a sequence of integers relative to the application of special rules and τ is a sequence of integers relative to the application of β rules.
The labeled versions of the intuitionistic rules given in Section 3 are the following:
If σ, τ β ∈ D then σ, τ.n β 1 ∈ D and σ, τ.n + 1 β 2 ∈ D where τ.n and τ.n + 1 are new sequences of integers
If σ, τ F ϕ ⊃ ψ ∈ D then σ.n, τ T ϕ ∈ D and σ.n, τ F ψ ∈ D where σ.n, τ is a new sequence
¬)
If σ, τ F ¬ψ ∈ D then σ.n, τ T ψ ∈ D where σ.n, τ is a new sequence For a sequence σ, a node D in a branch B is a maximal subset of B with respect to the property that for any two labels σ ′ , τ ′ and σ ′′ , τ ′′ of some formulae in D,
We identify a node with its maximal label σ, τ (maximal with respect to ).
A node in a branch is closed if it contains σ, τ T ϕ and σ, τ ′ F ϕ or σ, τ T ⊥ or σ, τ ′ F ⊤. A branch is closed if some node in the branch is closed. Finally, all the definitions introduced in Section 3 can be equivalently given for labeled tableaux.
The first two steps of the computation procedure can be easily implemented with the labeled tableaux: when a tableau restriction rule is applied, then the conclusion 1, 1 γ + is added to ∆ + and 1, 1 γ − is added to ∆ − . Both ∆ + and ∆ − are expanded according to the tableau rules presented in Table 1 .
We now want to build the analogues of Reiter's extensions on an intuitionistic basis. As in Section 4.2, Reiter's defaults are translated as
This implies that at each step ∆ + = ∆ − and D + = D − . When the computation halts, that is the first two steps of the procedure cannot be further applied, we need to check that any justification α − , used in the tableau construction, is consistent with the final theory ∆ + = ∆ − ; where a justification α containing T α − . Now, by the completeness theorem for intuitionistic tableaux, a node is contained in some prime set of sentences, hence it can be extended to some maximal set of formulae. This maximal set of formulae S can be found in the leaf nodes of the classical tableau for the set of formulae of ∆ + labeled with 1, 1 in D + . To see this in a different way, we may note that a formula α − is intuitionistic consistent with a set of formulae S iff S ∪{α − } is satisfiable in an intuitionistic Kripke
¿From the Gödel translation of classical logic into intuitionistic logic: ⊢ CL ϕ iff ⊢ IL ¬¬ϕ by substituting ϕ for ¬( S ∧α − ) and using the intuitionistic tautology ¬ϕ ≡ ¬¬¬ϕ,
Therefore we can use classical tableaux for ∆ − . If we now consider the three default systems analogous to those proposed by Reiter, Brewka and Lukaszewics, we obtain intuitionistic extensions in which the support ∆ − is classic.
Intuitionistic logic can be used as a logic for default reasoning when, for instance, we want to weaken the applicability of defaults by strenghtening truth conditions on the positive prerequisite. This leads to a more skeptical view of defaults. In fact, since the consistency in intuitionistic default tableaux is verified by a classical tableau, if an intuitionistic default is applied, then the corresponding classical default is also applied, but the converse is not true, as the following example shows:
Example 20 Consider the default theory of Example 14. Let us put as a prerequisite of δ, ¬¬p ⊃ p that is δ = ¬¬p ⊃ p : p ¬p . With classical logic we have no Reiter extension (see Example 14), while both in Lukaszewicz' and Brewka's extensions the assumption a is preserved. When the underlying logic is intuitionistic logic and the underlying control is the analogue of Reiter's system, this default theory has the assumption a also preserved, as the table in Figure 4 shows: Consider the example of the Broken arms, given in [Poo89c] . The pair W, D is as follows:
Either broken(x) or ¬broken(x), hence either x = lef t or x = right has to be proved in order to apply the default. This default theory, in intuitionistic logic has only one extension E = {broken(lef t) ∨ broken(right)}, while the meaning of the above default in classical logic is equivalent to:
Example 21 Note that the second default cannot be applied.
Default proof procedures: a comparison
The first default proof procedure has been formulated by Reiter [Rei80] and it is based on resolution. The procedure works for normal defaults, which, after all, is not such a strong limit. In fact, the proof of the conclusion γ of a default relies on a failure to prove ¬β 1 , . . . ¬β n , therefore with normal defaults the information of the provability of a conclusion γ can be easily unified with the schema of the failure to prove γ itself. However, Reiter [Rei80] has proved that, in the first order case, given a closed default theory ∆ and a closed well formed formula ϕ, the problem of the existence of an extension for ∆ containing ϕ is not semi-decidable (see also [BQQ83] ). This result gives an insight on the provability problem in default reasoning. A default proof has to run on two tracks, one for validity and the other for satisfiability and hence theoremhood in default reasoning shifts from decidability (if the logic is decidable and the set of defaults finite) to not semi-decidability (otherwise). So the problem of defining a proof-procedure for defaults can be clearly stated for finite default theories whose underlying logic is decidable. On the basis of this limiting results, the complexity of finding a default extension has been shown by Kautz and Selman [KS91] to be NP-hard for unary defaults 1 .
Others results, based on some restrictions on the default theories are given in [PS94] and [GM94c] (see [Got92, CS93] for a survey of these results). These works set a well-defined framework for proof-theoretic approaches. Since in general a default theory has more than one extension, one may introduce a notion of default consequence relation. The default consequence relation is obtained by checking membership of a sentence in one or more elements of the class of all extensions. Two main approaches may be defined, the brave and the skeptical one. The skeptical approach determines whether a formula belongs to all extensions and characterises the default inference relation which has been studied by Makinson in [Mak88, Mak93] , and implemented by [Poo89a, KS91] . However, in this paper we have not addressed the problem of default inference relations and thus we consider here just the proof theoretical approaches concerned with the computation of extensions. This problem has, in fact, been widely studied in the literature on default reasoning. Earlier approaches mainly focused on normal and semi-normal defaults (see for instance [BQQ83, Sch90, Poo91] ), or on some other restrictions on the logic, like ordered theories [Eth87, Mac91, JB91] or Horn theories [PGA87, Poo88, Poo89a] and [Poo89c, Jun89] .
Only recently automated deduction techniques have been used for wider classes of defaults, by exploiting resolution (see for instance ([Lev91]) or tableaux [SR91] ). Schwind and Risch [SR91] give a tableau characterization for default logic. They exploit the notion of grounded set of defaults 2 first given by Schwind [Sch90] . They first construct a tableau for W ∪ Cons(D), where Cons(D) is the set of conclusions of the default theory W, D . In the case that the tableau is closed, the contradiction is eliminated by removing those default conclusions that cause the contradiction. The idea is that of finding the greatest set of generating defaults D ′ such that W ∪ Cons(D ′ ) is consistent (see also [Mac91] ). This is essentially the parsimony principle of Reiter [Rei87] for computing diagnoses, successively extended by Poole [PGA87, Poo88, Poo89b] and by Gärdenfors and Makinson [GM94a] to handle normal defaults. Reiter computes hitting sets, for which an algebraic method is provided, to find out diagnoses, while Schwind and Risch [SR91] do not solve the problem of how to compute extensions. The problem is that, in the general case, it is not sufficient to make the tableau open to obtain the set of generating defaults in so that additional properties, not concerned with the tableau construction, need to be verified and the whole process must be iterated until a set of generating default is found. Similar problems arise in the proof procedure presented by Levy in [Lev91] . Levy uses CAT-correct resolution, a form of resolution based on the classification of data into two groups, typed and not typed. Then he translates defaults into CAT-clauses to compute the extensions. However his method, in order to deal with default theories having more than one extension, must be augmented with some external structure like that of an oriented graph of dependencies between defaults.
Differently from these approaches extensions are verified within the default tableau construction without resorting to extra considerations. Our approach is general because it allows a tableau construction for any propositional default theory with any underlying logic for which a tableau method is given.
As a final consideration we point out that Etherington semantics has inspired the present work. In fact, the semantics he presents in [Eth88] is mainly based on the idea of building a sequence of structures (where each structure is a set of classical interpretations). Now, each structure in the sequence is obtained by deleting some classical interpretation from the previous structure on the basis of the validity of the consequences and the satisfiability of the justifications of an applied default in the structure. This process is close to the default tableau construction.
